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Abstract
We study sets of preferences that are convex with respect to the be-
tweeness relation induced by the Kemeny distance for preferences. It
appears that these sets consist of all preferences containing a certain par-
tial ordering and the other way around all preferences containing a given
partial ordering form a convex set. Next we consider restricted domains
where each agent has a convex set of preferences. Necessary and su¢ cient
conditions are formulated under which a restricted domain admits unan-
imous, strategy-proof and non-dictatorial choice rules. Loosly speeking
it boils down to admitting monotone and non-image-dictatorial decision
rules on two alternatives where the other alternatives are completely dis-
regarded.
1 Introduction
One attempt to avoid the well-known impossibility theorems of Arrow and
Gibbard-Satterthwaite on collective decision making is dropping the unrestricted
domain condition. It means that the individuals taking part in this collective de-
cision potentially may have any preference of a certain kind, e.g. linear orderings
or weak orderings over the collective alternatives on which has to be decided.
Relaxing this condition leads to so-called restricted domains. Here agents po-
tentially may only have preferences from a subset of this set of preferences or it
leads to domains for collective decision making in which all preferences are po-
tentially possible but certain combinations of these are only allowed. Here like
in e.g. Kalai e.a.[1977] and Kalai e.a.[1980] and Ritz[1985] we investigate do-
mains allowing `reasonablecollective decision rules, where at these domains the
individual preferences may be chosen independently. Hence, every individual is
characterized by a set of admissible preferences being a subset of all possible
preferences. Moreover, we assume that any preference which is an intermediate
of two admissible preferences is admissible as well.
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There are many studies on domain restrictions (See for a general overview
e.g. Gaertner [2002]). Examples on restrictions of combinations of individual
preferences can for instance be found in the well-known literature on characteriz-
ing domains which allow for consistent pairwise majority decisions. (See e.g. Sen
e.a.[1969] and Inada [1964]). A well-known example on restrictions which allow
for independent individual preferences is that of single peaked preferences.(See
e.g. Arrow[1978], Black[1948] and Moulin[1980] being just an arbitrary choice
of this strand of literature).
Having two preferences by repeatedly swapping consecutive ordered pairs of
alternatives the one preference can be obtained from the other. The domain re-
striction imposed here demands that all the intermediate results in this swapping
process are admissible if of course the starting two preferences are admissible.
In this way we guarantee a natural assumption that the set of admissible pref-
erences of an individual allows for a continuous change of these preferences. For
instance let at one admissible preference alternative a be strictly preferred to b
and b strictly to c (assuming transitivity we also have that a is strictly preferred
to c) and at an other preference let c be strictly preferred to a and a strictly to
b. So, in both preferences a is strictly preferred to b, where in the one c is worst
among these three and in the other c is best. As both these preferences are
admissible it is natural to assume that also the intermediate of these two where
c is ordered between a and b is admissible. Precisely this is captured by the
requirement that the intermediate of two admissible preferences is admissible.
Consider the Kemeny distance between preferences. For any two preferences
it counts the pairs that are di¤erently ordered in these two preferences (see also
Kemeny e.a. [1962]). It is easy to see that a preference is intermediate of two
given preferences if the Kemeny distance between these two equals the sum of the
Kemeny distances from each of these to the intermediate. That is the triangle
inequality holds with equality. Geometrically speaking this intermediate is on
the segment between the other two. Hence, the condition on the intermediate is
just a convexity requirement with respect to the Kemeny distance. That is we
demand that the set of admissible preferences is a convex subset of the set of all
preferences. Clearly such a convex set may range from the set of all preferences,
the least restrictive situation as there is no restriction imposed, to a singleton
set the most restrictive case. It appears that a convex subset of the set of linear
orderings, i.e. the set of all complete, antisymmetric and transitive relations,
can be characterized as follows. For every convex set there is a partial ordering,
i.e. reexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation, which is contained in all
preferences belonging to this set and moreover any linear ordering containing
this partial ordering belongs to this convex set. So, a subset of the set of linear
orderings is convex if, and only if, there is a partial ordering such that this convex
set equals the set of all linear orderings that contain this partial ordering.
Next consider the case of restricted domains where the sets of individu-
ally admissible preferences are convex subsets of the set of linear orderings.
The set of admissible preferences of a specic individual is characterized by a
partial ordering that is contained in all its admissible preferences. Therefore
this partial ordering can be seen as a part of the preference of that individual
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which is known in advance. It is called a priori information. Hence, the re-
stricted domain at hand is completely determined by these individual partial
orderings. A natural question is which combination of individual partial or-
derings determines a restricted domain allowing for non-dictatorial, unanimous
and strategy-proof choice rules. We will answer this question with respect to
the union of all these partial orderings: the united a priori information. In
Storcken[1985] a similar question is studied with respect to Arrow-like welfare
functions. These are Pareto-optimal, non-dictatorial welfare functions which
are independent of irrelevant alternatives. Roughly speaking such a restricted
domain admits Arrow-like welfare functions if not all free triples with respect
to the united a priori information are connected. Here a free triple with re-
spect to this a priori information is a triple of alternatives which has no ordered
pair of di¤erent alternatives in common with this united a priori information.
This means that all agents may order these three alternatives in all six possible
ways. In the paper at hand the characterization looks at least more restric-
tive. Loosely speaking these domains allow for unanimous, non-dictatorial and
strategy-proof choice rules if there are (at most) two undominated alternatives
with respect to the united a priori information. Moreover, the choice rule now
is just a monotonic choice rule between these two alternatives.
This di¤erence in conditions on the united a priori information between the
welfare function case and the choice function case stems primarily from the non-
dictatorship requirement. Contrary to a choice function at a welfare function an
individual might not be a dictator even if his best alternative is always ordered
best in the social ranking as long as somewhere the rest of his preferences is not
always copied as the social ranking. Moreover, as the domain in this setting is
possibly restricted, not all alternatives might be ranked best by this individual.
To be more explicit let i be an individual and a an alternative. Let further the set
of admissible preferences of individual i be equal to the set of linear orderings
in which a is ordered best. For other individuals let there be no restriction.
The hierarchical welfare function in which at any preference prole a is ordered
best and all the other alternatives are ordered according to the preference of
some xed individual j di¤erent from i is Pareto-optimal, non-dictatorial and
independent if irrelevant alternatives. Lemma 3 however shows that this domain
does not allow for unanimous, non-dictatorial and strategy-proof choice rules.
This shows that although the earlier paper of Storcken[1985] and the present
work are based on strongly related ideas, they seem logically independent.
Indeed Lemmas 1 and 2 show that in case there are at least three undom-
inated alternatives with respect to the united a prior information then only
dictatorial choice rules are unanimous and strategy-proof. Having this result
it is straight forward to see that essentially the case of two undominated al-
ternatives with respect to the united a priori information yield the possibility
of non-dictatorial, unanimous and strategy-proof choice rules. Rules that are
unanimous and monotonic choices between two alternatives. The cases of one
and no undominated alternatives are reduced to the two undominated alterna-
tives case. This however may fail as the example above on one undominated
alternative a demonstrates. Lemmas 3 and 4 are on necessary and su¢ cient
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conditions in order to transform these cases to the case of two undominated
alternatives.
The paper is organized as follows. Besides some basic concepts on preferences
section 2 is on the character of convex subsets of the set of linear orderings. In
section 3 the decision model on convex restricted domains is introduced. Section
4 discusses su¢ cient and necessary conditions such that these domains admit
non-dictatorial, unanimous and strategy-proof choice rules. Section 5 concludes.
2 Convex sets of preferences
Let A denote a non-empty and nite set of alternatives and R a relation on A.
For a non-empty subset B of A the restriction of R to B is denoted by RjB . The
best alternatives with respect to R are dened by best(R) = fx 2 Aj(x; y) 2 R
for all y 2 Ag. The undominated alternatives with respect to R are dened by
undom(R) = fx 2 Aj(y; x) =2 R for all y 2 Ag. Let L(A) denote the set of all
linear orderings on A, i.e. all transitive, complete and anti-symmetric relations
on A. Cardinality of a set S is denoted by #S.
Let R1, R2 and R3 be three linear orderings on A. Let B be a non-trivial
subset of A. The relation R1jB  R2jA B = R1jB [ R2jA B [ (B  (A   B))
is a relation in which the alternatives in B are ordered as in R1 the alternatives
in A   B are ordered as in R2 and in which all alternatives in B are strictly
preferred to all alternatives in A   B. As a convention we write x instead of
R1jfxg for alternatives x. Further, instead of (x; y) 2 R1 and (y; x) =2 R1 we also
write R1 = :::x :::y:::. The notation R1 = :::x y::: means that (x; y) 2 R1
and (y; x) =2 R1 and in addition there are no alternatives z which are ordered in
between x and y. The Kemeny distance1 between R1 and R2 is dened by
(R1; R2) :=
1
2
#[(R1  R2) [ (R2  R1)].
This distance equals the number of setups needed to change relation R1 into
R2. We will call a single setup an elementary change, i.e. R1 and R2 form such
an elementary change if there are two alternatives a and b such that R1 = (R2
[f(a; b)g)   f(b; a)g. Linear ordering R3 is said to be between R1 and R2 if it
is on a shortest path from R1 to R3, i.e. (R1; R2) = (R1; R3) + (R3; R2).
In that case R3 can be seen as an intermediate in the change of R1 into R2
by reversing pairs of alternatives. Clearly this equality holds if, and only if,
(R1\R2)  R3  (R1[R2). A set of linear orderings say V is said to be convex
if for all R1, R2 in V and all R3 in L(A) if R3 is between R1 and R2 , then R3
is in V . The following proposition characterizes convexity of sets of preferences.
Proposition 1 Let V be a set of linear orderings. Then V is a convex set if,
and only if, there is a partial ordering say P on A, i.e. transitive, reexive and
1We take here half the Kemeny distance because between complete anti-symmetric relations
this distance is an even number.
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anti-symmetric, such that
V = fR 2 L(A)jP  Rg.
Proof. (if-part) Let V = fR 2 L(A)jP  Rg. Furthermore let R1, R2 2 V , R3
in L(A) such that R3 is between R1 and R2. It is su¢ cient to proof that R3 is
in V . Because R3 is between R1 and R2 we have (R1 \R2)  R3. As R1, R2 2
V = fR 2 L(A)jP  Rg it follows that P  (R1\R2). So, P  (R1\R2)  R3.
So, R3 2 fR 2 L(A)jP  Rg = V .
(only-if-part) Let V be a convex set of linear orderings. Dene P = \fRjR 2
V g. As all relations in V are reexive, transitive and anti-symmetric P has these
three properties. Now by denition of P it follows that V  fR 2 L(A)jP  Rg.
We have to proof that fR 2 L(A)jP  Rg  V . To the contrary suppose this is
not the case. Then we may nd an elementary change, say R1 and R2 such that
R1 2 V and R2 2 fR 2 L(A)jP  Rg   V . So, there are two alternatives say
a and b such that R1 = (R2 [f(a; b)g)   f(b; a)g. As V  fR 2 L(A)jP  Rg
it follows that both R1 and R2 are in fR 2 L(A)jP  Rg. Hence, neither (a; b)
nor (b; a) is in P . Now by the denition of P and by the convexity of V we may
assume the existence of two preferences say R3 and R4 in V such that R3 = (R4
[f(a; b)g)   f(b; a)g, that is these two preferences form an elementary change
in this same pair a and b. Now (R1 \ R4)  R2  (R1 [ R4), which means
that R2 is between R1 and R4. But then by the convexity of V we derive the
contradiction R2 2 V .
3 Convex restricted domains
Consider collective choice rules involving nite sets of alternatives A and agents
N = f1; 2; :::ng both containing at least two elements. To an agent i we associate
Vi a convex subset of the set of linear orderings L(A). This set Vi represents
the set of admissible preferences of this agent. By Proposition1 there is a partial
ordering P i such that Vi = L(P i; A) = fR 2 L(A)jP i  Rg. So, this partial
ordering P imay be considered as the a priori information we have about agent
is preference. Let VN denote the set of all proles p of individual admissible
preferences. The prole p assigns to every agent i a preference p(i) in Vi. A
(collective) choice rule is a function f from VN to A. It assigns to every prole
of individual admissible preferences p a collective choice f(p).
Hereafter choice rules f are studied with respect to the following ve condi-
tions:
Unanimity : f(p) = a for all proles p and alternatives a such that best(p(i)) =
a for all agents i,
Strategy-proofness: (f(p); f(q)) 2 p(j) for all agents j and all j-deviations p
and q, i.e. p; q 2 VN with pjN fjg = qjN fjg,
Maskin Monotonicity : for all proles p and q such that (f(p); x) 2 p(i)
implies (f(p); x) 2 q(i) for all agents i and all alternatives x we have that
f(q) = f(p),
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Strong Positive Association: for proles p and q and alternatives a if for all
agents i in N p(i)jA fag = q(i)jA fag and (a; b) 2 p(i) implies (a; b) 2 q(i) for
all alternatives b 2 A, then f(q) 2 fa; f(p)g.
Non-image-dictatorship: for all agents j there are proles p such that f(p) 6=
best(p(j)jf(VN )), where f(VN ) = ff(p)jp 2 VNg is the range of f:
Strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity, unanimity and strong positive as-
sociation are standard in literature. We will not comment on these further.
Usually a weaker version of non-dictatorship is used it is dened as follows
for all agents j there are proles p such that f(p) 6= best(p(j)).
Omitting the restriction to the image of f would yield that many con-
vex restricted domains VN admit odd unanimous, strategy-proofness and non-
dictatorial choice rules. For instance if there are agents i and j and alternatives
a and b such that (a; b) 2 P i and b 2 undom(P j). In that case dene f for an
arbitrary prole as follows
f(p) = best(p(j)jA fbg).
This choice rule is strategy-proof, unanimous and image-dictatorial with
image-dictator j, but it is non-dictatorial as b is not chosen if it is js best alter-
native. Strategy-proofness follows by the dictatorial nature of this rule. Note
that unanimity does not apply to b. So, obviously the choice rule is unanimous.
Clearly non-image-dictatorship is a stronger condition than non-dictatorship,
because f(p) = best(p(j)) implies best(p(j)) 2 f(VN ) and therefore f(p) =
best(p(j)) implies f(p) = best(p(j)jf(VN )). To avoid odd possibilities like dis-
cussed above we strengthened non-dictatorship to non-image-dictatorship.
Remark 1 Because of the convexity of the domain of individual preferences
and the anti-symmetry condition on these individual preferences it follows that
strategy-proofness, Maskin monotonicity and strong positive association are all
three equivalent to each other. See also Bochet ea.[2005].
Remark 2 Note that for strategy-proof choice rules f from VN to A and proles
p and q such that pjf(VN ) = qjf(VN ) we have that f(p) = f(q).
4 Possibilities under Unanimity
In this section we investigate convex restricted domains VN which allow for
strategy-proof, unanimous and non-image-dictatorial choice rules. Therefore,
call VN a possibility domain if there exists a unanimous, strategy-proof and
non-image-dictatorial choice rule f from VN to A. Let P  = [fP iji 2 Ng the
union of all a priori information. Related to P  we will formulate necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for convex restricted domains such that these are possibility
domains.
The following example deals with a possibility domain that essentially entails
the format of any possibility domain in case there are precisely two undominated
alternatives.
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Example 1 Let undom(P ) = fa; bg, where a 6= b. Now any non-image-
dictatorial monotonic choice rule on these two alternatives yields a unanimous,
strategy-proof and non-image-dictatorial choice rule on VN . To be more explicit
let Wa and Wb be two sets of subsets of N such that for x 2 fa; bg and for
S  T  N
1. non of these sets in Wx is a singleton,
2. N 2Wx,
3. if S 2Wx and S  T  N , then T 2Wx,
4. S 2Wa if, and only if, (N   S) =2Wb.
Dene choice rule f from VN to A for a prole p as follows
f(p) = a if fi 2 N j(a; b) 2 p(i)g 2Wa
= b if fi 2 N j(b; a) 2 p(i)g 2Wb.
Now f is well-dened because of condition (4). Strategy-proofness follows be-
cause of the monotonicity condition (3) and non-image-dictatorship because of
condition (1). As a and b are the only undominated elements of P  unanimity
has no bite on the other conditions. Unanimity on a and b now follows from
condition (2).
Example 1 shows that if the united a priori information P  has two undomi-
nated elements, then the domain allows for strategy-proof, non-image-dictatorial
and unanimous choice rules. Let U = undom(P ). It appears that the cardi-
nality of #U of U plays an important role in whether or not a domain at hand
allows for non-image-dictatorial, unanimous and strategy-proof choice rules. For
agents i let eP i = P i [ (U  (A   U)) and eVi = L( eP i; A). Because P i  eP i,
it follows that eVi  Vi for all agents i. Note that at proles in eVN all agents
prefer all alternatives in U to all alternatives which are not in U . As the alter-
natives in U are undominated elements of the union of all a priori information
P  it follows that no agent a priori prefers any among these. So, if we would
restrict all linear orderings in eVi to U then we would obtain the set of all linear
orderings on U : eVijU = L(U).
For the four cases #U  3, #U = 2, #U = 1 and #U = 0 we will investigate
the possibilities of non-image-dictatorial, unanimous and strategy-proof choice
rule h from VN to A. Let h be a unanimous and strategy-proof choice rule
from VN to A. For the case #U  3 the following two Lemmas yield that h is
image-dictatorial.
Lemma 1 Let #U > 3. Then there is an agent, say j, such that for all proles
p in VN and all alternatives x 2 U if best(p(j)) = x, then h(p) = x.
Proof. Let eh = hjeVN . As eh inherits unanimity and strategy-proofness from
h, it follows that eh is Maskin monotone and unanimous. From this we may
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easily deduce that eh( eVN ) = U . Moreover, note that by Maskin monotonicity
it now follows that for proles p and q in eVN eh(p) = eh(q) if pjU = qjU . So,eh can be seen as a choice rule on eVN jU = L(U)N . Gibbard-Satterthwaite
[1973,1975] yields that eh is dictatorial, with dictator say j. Now let p be a
prole in VN with best(p(j)) = x 2 U . It is su¢ cient to prove h(p) = x. Take
y 2 U  fxg and proles q and r in VN such that q(j) = x y  p(j)jA fx;yg,
r(j) = x  y  p(j)jU fx;yg  p(j)jA U , q(i) = y  p(i)jA fyg and r(i) =
y  p(i)jU fyg  p(i)jA U for agents i di¤erent from j. As r 2 eVN and eh
is dictatorial with dictator j it follows that h(r) = x. Strategy-proofness and
unanimity imply that h(q) =2 A fx; yg. So, h(q) 2 fx; yg. As h(r) = x Maskin
monotonicity implies that h(q) 6= y. So, h(q) = x. By Maskin monotonicity this
implies h(p) = x.
Lemma 1 shows that if there are enough undominated elements with respect
to the union of a priori information, then there is an agent which is image-
dictatorial on all these undominated elements. The lemma hereafter shows that
this decisiveness spreads on all alternatives in the image of choice rule h.
Lemma 2 Let #U > 3. Then there is an agent, say j, such that for all proles
p in VN and all alternatives x 2 h(VN ) if best(p(j)jh(VN )) = x, then h(p) = x.
Hence, h is image-dictatorial with image-dictator j.
Proof. Let j be as in Lemma 1. Let x 2 h(VN ) and best(p(j)jh(VN )) = x.
As x 2 h(VN ) there is a prole w 2 VN with h(w) = x. We will construct a
list of proles starting with w and ending at p and prove for all these proles
that their image is x under h. Consider prole v a j-deviation of w such that
v(j) = p(j) and v(i) = w(i) for i 6= j. Because of strategy-proofness and
best(p(j)jh(VN )) = x it follows from h(w) = x that h(v) = x. Now let a and
b be two di¤erent alternatives in U . Without loss of generality assume that
(b; a) 2 p(j). Consider prole u dened for all i di¤erent from j by u(i) =
b  v(i)jA fbg. Let u(j) be obtained from v(j) by shifting a just below x and
b just below a: u(i) = :::x  a  b:::. So, u(j)jA fa;bg = v(j)jA fa;bg and
u(j) ranks x just above a just above b. Let eu be the j-deviation of v such
that eu(j) = u(j). Because of h(v) = x, Maskin monotonicity implies that
h(eu) = x. But then h(u) 6= a, because otherwise Maskin monotonicity would
imply that h(eu) = a if h(u) = a. To see that h(u) 6= b consider prole bu
a j-deviation of u such that bu(j) = a  u(j)jA fag. By Lemma 1 we have
that h(bu) = a. Now h(u) 6= b, because otherwise Maskin monotonicity would
imply that h(bu) = b if h(u) = b. Finally unanimity and strategy-proofness
imply that h(u) =2 h(VN )   fa; b; xg. So, h(u) = x. Let prole r be the j-
deviation of u such that r(j)jA fbg = p(j)jA fbg and r(j)jA fag = u(j)jA fag.
Maskin monotonicity implies that h(r) = x. Let q be the prole such that
q(j) = r(j) and for all agents i di¤erent from j let q(i) = b p(i)jA fbg. Maskin
monotonicity and h(r) = x implies h(q) 6= b. Strategy-proofness and unanimity
imply that h(q) =2 h(VN )  fb; xg. So, h(q) = x and Maskin monotonicity now
implies h(p) = x.
8
For the case #U = 2 Example 1 shows that there are non-image-dictororial,
unanimous and strategy-proof choice rules. Example 2 below shows a case in
which such choice rules exist in case#U = 1. Moreover, the su¢ ciency condition
implicitly spelled out by this example appears to be necessary as is shown in
Lemma 3 below.
Example 2 let U = fag and let b 2 A fag such that (a; b) =2 P 1 [P 2. Dene
choice rule f from VN to A for a prole p as follows
f(p) = b if both (b; a) 2 p(1) and (b; a) 2 p(2)
= a in all other cases.
Clearly f is non-image-dictatorial and because U = fag unanimity has no bite
on alternatives di¤erent from a. Hence, by denition it follows that f is unan-
imous. Strategy-proofness follows because f is essentially a monotonic choice
rule between two alternatives.
Actually in Example 2 we dened a choice rule on two alternatives and two
agents where neither the rest of the agents nor the rest of the alternatives can
inuence the outcome. they act just like dummies. It is clear however that we
may dene choice rules at which more agents, say j, can have an impact on
the outcome if for such agents (a; b) =2 P j . It is also clear if there is only one
agent say agent 1 for which (a; b) =2 P 1 the choice rule dened in Example 2
is image-dictatorial. The following Lemma 3 shows that if U = fag for some
alternative a, then the existence of an alternative b 6= a such that for two agents
i and j (a; b) =2 P i [ P j is not only a su¢ cient but also a necessary condition
such that h is non-image-dictatorial.
Lemma 3 Let U = fag for some alternative a in A. Then the following two
are equivalent
1. There are di¤erent agents i and j and an alternative b 2 A   fag such
that (a; b) =2 P i [ P j;
2. There exist unanimous, strategy-proof and non-image-dictatorial choice
rules f from VN to A.
Proof. ((1) implies (2)) This implication follows by Example 2.
((2) implies (1)) To prove the contra position of this implication suppose
() For all alternatives b 2 A   fag there are agents ib such that (a; b) 2 P j
for all j 2 N   fibg;
() Choice rules f from VN to A is unanimous and strategy-proof.
It is su¢ cient to proof that f is image-dictatorial. By unanimity and U =
fag it follows that a 2 f(VN ). If f(VN ) = fag, then f is constant and every
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agent is image-dictator of f . Let fa; bg = f(VN ) for some b 2 A  fag. In view
of Remark 2 assumption () and unanimity of f yield that for a prole r
f(r) = b if (b; a) 2 p(ib)
= a in all other cases.
So, agent ib is image-dictator of f . Finally, consider the case that f(VN )
has at least three elements. Let b; c 2 f(VN ) and a, b and c be all di¤er-
ent. We rst prove that ib = ic. Then we show that this agent is image-
dictator. To the contrary assume that ib 6= ic. In view of assumption () and
Maskin monotonicity for all x 2 f(VN )   fag there are proles px such that
f(px) = x, for all j 2 N   fixg best(px(j)) = a and px(ix) = :::x  a:::.
Consider prole q dened by q(ib) = pb(ib), q(ic) = pc(ic) and best(q(j)) = a
for all j 2 N   fib; icg. By assumption () it follows that (a; b) 2 pc(ic) and
(a; c) 2 pb(ib). Because f(pb) = b Maskin monotonicity implies f(q) 6= a. Let
r be a prole dened by qjN fib;icg = rjN fib;icg, r(ib) = a pb(ib)jA fag and
r(ic) = a  pc(ic)jA fag. By unanimity f(r) = a, so Maskin monotonicity
implies (f(q); a) 2 q(ib) or (f(q); a) 2 q(ic). Because of f(q) 6= a, assumption
() implies either (a; f(q)) 2 q(ib) or (a; f(q)) 2 q(ic). Without loss of gen-
erality assume (f(q); a) 2 q(ib) and therewith consequently (a; f(q)) 2 q(ic).
Consider prole v dened by vjN fibg = qjN fibg and v(ib) = a pb(ib)jA fag
comparing q and v Strong Positive Association yields that f(v) 2 fa; f(q)g. If
f(v) = f(q); then f is manipulable by agent ic at prole v towards prole r.
If f(v) = a, then Maskin monotonicity implies the contradiction f(pc) = a.
Hence, ib = ic. Since b and c were arbitrary choices we may conclude that there
is an agent i such that i = ix for all x 2 f(VN )  fag. In order to prove that i
is image-dictator of f let w be a prole in VN such that x = best(w(i)jf(VN )).
It is su¢ cient to prove that f(w) = x. To the contrary let f(w) = y 6= x.
By assumption () we have that (a; z) 2 w(j) for all z 2 f(VN )   fag and
all j 2 N   fig. According to Remark 2 we may assume that a = best(w(j))
for all j 2 N   fig. Because f(w) = y it follows by unanimity and strategy-
proofness that (y; a) 2 w(i). Consider i-deviation u of w such that u(j) = w(j)
for j 2 N  fig, u(i) = :::x a::: and u(i)jA fag = w(i)jA fag. Strong Positive
Association implies that f(u) 2 fa; yg. As (a; y) 2 u(i) unanimity and startegy-
proofness imply that f(u) 6= y in case a 6= y. So, f(u) = a. But then Maskin
monotonicity implies f(px) = a, where px(i) = u(i) and pxjN fig = pxjN fig.
Because f(px) = x and (x; a) 2 px(i), where x 6= a, it follows that f is ma-
nipulable at px by agent i towards prole px. This contradiction yields that
f(w) = x and f is image-dictatorial with image-dictator i.
Finally, we consider the case where U = ;. First we introduce an example
which expresses a su¢ cient condition. Then like in the case that U is a singleton
we show that this su¢ cient condition is also necessary.
Example 3 Let U = ;. Let a; b 2 A, with a 6= b, such that (a; b) =2 P 1 [ P 2
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and (b; a) =2 P 1 [ P 2. Dene choice rule f for a prole p as follows
f(p) = b if both (b; a) 2 p(1) and (b; a) 2 p(1)
= a in all other cases.
Like in Example 2 it follows that f is unanimous, strategy-proof and non-image-
dictatorial.
Lemma 4 Let U = ;. hen the following two are equivalent
1. There are di¤erent agents i and j and alternative a,b 2 A such that (a; b) =2
P i [ P j and (b; a) =2 P i [ P j;
2. There exist unanimous, strategy-proof and non-image-dictatorial choice
rules f from VN to A.
Proof. ((1) implies (2)) This implication follows by Example 3.
((2) implies (1)) To prove the contra position of this implication suppose
() For all alternatives a,b 2 A, with a 6= b there are agents iab such that for
all j 2 N   fiabg (a; b) 2 P j or (b; a) 2 P j ;
() Choice rules f from VN to A is unanimous and strategy-proof.
It is su¢ cient to proof that f is image-dictatorial. If f(VN ) is a singleton,
then f is a constant choice rule and all agents are image-dictator. So, let f(VN )
consist of more than one element. Because VN is a convex restricted domain
we may assume that there are an agent i, alternatives a and b, with a 6= b, and
proles pa and pb such that f(pa) = a, f(pb) = b, pajN fig = pbjN fig and
pa(i) = (pb(i)  f(b; a)g) [ f(a; b)g. From assumption () we infer that i = iab.
Next let Xa = fp 2 VN j p(i) = pa(i)g and let Xb = fp 2 VN j p(i) = pb(i)g.
We show that f(Xa) = fag and f(Xb) = fbg. Let qa and qb by j-deviations
of pa and pb respectively from some agent j 2 N   fig, such that pajN fjg =
qajN fjg, pbjN fjg = qbjN fjgand qa(j) = qb(j) = (pa(j)   f(x; y)g) [ f(y; x)g
for some alternatives x; y 2 A. Because VN is convex restricted in order to
prove f(Xa) = fag and f(Xb) = fbg it is su¢ cient to prove that f(qa) = a
and f(qb) = b. Assumption () yields that j = ixy. But as j 6= i and i = iab,
this implies by assumption () that fa; bg 6= fx; yg. If a =2 fx; yg, then by
Maskin monotonicity we have f(qa) = a and f(qb) 6= a. But as Strong Positive
Association and f(qa) = a imply f(qb) 2 fa; bg it follows that f(qb) = b. Hence,
if a =2 fx; yg, then f(qa) = a and f(qb) = b. Similarly it follows that if b =2 fx; yg,
then f(qa) = a and f(qb) = b. Because fa; bg 6= fx; yg, at least one of these
implications hold and therewith f(qa) = a and f(qb) = b. Hence, f(Xa) = fag
and f(Xb) = fbg.
For R 2 Vi let XR = fp 2 VN j p(i) = Rg. Hence, Xa = Xpa(i) and
Xb = Xpb(i). The following two claims complete the proof.
Claim 1 Let R 2 Vi be such that f(XR) = fxg. Then x = best(Rjf(VN )).
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To the contrary let x 6= y = best(Rjf(VN )). Then there are py 2 VN such
that f(py) = y. Consider i-deviation pxy of py such that pxyjN fig = pyjN fig
and pxy(i) = R. Because f(XR) = fxg we have f(pxy) = x and herewith f is
manipulable by agent i at pxy towards prole py.
Claim 2 Let R1 and R2 be two relations in Vi that form an elementary change
in x; y 2 A, i.e. R1 = (R2   f(y; x)g) [ f(x; y)g. Let f(XR1) = fcg for some
alternative c in A. Then f(XR2) = fdg for some alternative d in A.
In case x 6= c Maskin monotonicity and f(XR1) = fcg imply f(XR2) = fcg.
So, suppose c = x. We are also done if f(XR2) = fcg. As Vi is a convex
restricted domain we therefore may assume that there are pc 2 XR1and pd 2
XR2 where c = f(pc) 6= f(pd) = d and pcjN fig = pdjN fig. Now similarly to
the proof of f(Xa) = a and f(Xb) = b it follows that f(XR2) = fdg.
Claims 1 and 2 and the fact that VN is a convex restricted domain imply
that f is image-dictatotrial.
Summarizing the above results yields
Corollary 1 Let VN be a convex restricted domain. Hence, for all agents i
Vi = fR 2 L(A)jP i  Rg for some partial ordering P i referred to as is a priori
information. Let P  = [fP iji 2 Ng denote the collective a priori information.
Let U = undom(P ) be the set of undominated elements with respect to this
collective a priori information P . Then (1) and (2) are equivalent, where
1. There exist non-image-dictatorial, unanimous and strategy-proof choice
rules f from VN to A;
2. Either one of the following three
a There are two alternatives a and b such that U = fa; bg;
b There is one alternative a such that U = fag and there is an alternative
b 2 A fag and there are two di¤erent agents, say i and j, such that
(a; b) =2 P i [ P j;
c Set U is empty and there are two di¤erent alternatives, say a and b,
and two di¤erent agents, say i and j, such that (a; b) =2 P i [ P j and
(b; a) =2 P i [ P j.
5 Conclusions
Corollary 1 describes the convex restricted domains which allow for unanimous,
non-image-dictatorial and strategy-proof choice rules. The main requirement
that there are at most two undominated alternatives with respect to the united
a priori information is considerably restrictive. Therefore the characterization
can also be seen as an impossibility result. On the other hand these conditions
would only change marginally if anonymity were taken instead of non-image-
dictatorship. Where anonymity is a condition that imposes that the choice rule
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can be dened on the frequency distributions of the preferences in a prole. So,
agents are treated equally. Indeed considering Example 1 it is easy to dene
anonymous choice rules on two alternatives. The case of two undominated
alternative would not change at all. In case of one or no undominated alternative
di¤erences occur because for instance a constant rule is anonymous but also
image-dictatorial.
Another condition frequently imposed on choice rules is Pareto-optimality.
It means that an alternative x is not chosen when there are alternatives y which
all agents (strictly) prefer to x. It is not di¢ cult to see that the choice rules
of Example 1 are not necessarily Pareto-optimal. There are however special
cases of this example which allow for Pareto-optimal, non-image dictatorial
and strategy-proof choice rules. To illustrate this take the same notations and
assumptions as in Example 1. Furthermore, assume that for all c 2 A   fa; bg
(a; c) 2 P . Now the following imputation rule f is well-dened and satises
these three conditions.
f(p) = b if (b; a) 2 p(i) for all agents i 2 N
= a in all other cases.
Pareto-optimality is a stronger condition than unanimity. In view of the
restrictive result spelled out by Corollary 1 we therefore did not incorporate an
extensive study on convex restricted domains which allow for Pareto-optimal,
non-(image)-dictatorial and strategy-proof choice rules.
Based on Corollary 1 and the remarks made above one might argue that
changing the conditions of admissible choice rules will not lead to more general
convex restricted domains which allow for such rules. Hence the concept of con-
vexity is too restrictive after all. Indeed if we weaken the convexity condition,
i.e. that all intermediate preferences of two admissible preferences are admissi-
ble, into connectedness, i.e. there is a path of intermediate preferences leading
from one to the other admissible preference, then more general restricted do-
mains may allow for "nice " choice rules. For example the domains discussed
here as well those of single peaked preferences fall under this connectedness
condition and both allow for acceptable choice rules.
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